Explaining High Congressional Staff Turnover

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Abstract

Congressional staff play an essential role in the functioning of Congress. Over the years, congressional staff turnover has increased, which may contribute to declines in congressional productivity. We utilize a new survey of congressional staffers to assess reasons why congressional staffers leave. We find moderate support for low pay and long hours as reasons why staffers leave. We find strong support for poor management and a lack of impactful work as reasons why staffers leave. Our analysis suggests ways in which congressional offices can improve staff retention, and hopefully contribute to greater congressional productivity, making Congress a more responsive institution.

Keywords: word1; word2; word3; and word4

1 Abstract

2 Introduction

Any observer who peeks inside a typical congressional office today would be immediately struck by the following observation: the office is staffed by very young people. In a 2009 survey, the Congressional Management Foundation found that 27 percent of House legislative directors are under 30 years old, and 87 percent are under 40 years old. (Congressional Management Foundation, 2009). Ages are almost are almost surely younger now, given that the House has cut spending on congressional offices by 35 percent since 2010. (The survey, however, has not been done since) If that observer were then inquire as to the tenure of various staffers, she would find that most have not worked in the office for very long, a conclusion consistent with the youthful faces.

Data bear this out. In a 2010 survey, the Congressional Management Foundation found that half of House Legislative Directors had been in their position for fewer than three years, and 80 percent had been in their position for fewer than six years (Congressional Management Foundation, 2010). Meanwhile 72 percent of Legislative Aides had been in their position for fewer than three years. Drutman (2012) found that over a two-year period (2009-2011), the average House office retained only 64 percent of its staff, though there was considerable variation across offices. Similarly, Roziak (2012) found that one-third of all House staffers had one year or less of experience, and two-thirds had fewer than five years of experience. Half of committee staff had only four years of experience.

Finally, if that observer were to then hang around further and begin to engage in substantive policy discussions with policy staffers within the office, she might at first be struck by the remarkable breadth of knowledge that a typical staffer has of a wide range of issues. But upon further inquiry, she would likely struck by the fact that most of this knowledge is largely superficial, without much detail and depth. Thats because individual staffers are expected to handle a wide range of policy issues. And with high turnover, inexperienced staff are constantly being forced to start from scratch on difficult topics. Many staffers are quite smart and energetic, but the demands placed upon them are increasingly super-human for someone in their position: to become an instant expert on a dozen difficult policy topics; and then to then use that expertise to balance out an onslaught of competing policy demands, all argued by experienced lobbyists, many of whom have not only spent years mastering the intricacies of particular policies and technical industry details, but have also simultaneously honed their skills of argument and presentation. Many will also have existing relationships of trust with staffers' bosses.

3 The Importance of Staff

Members of Congress depend on information. Members make decision on how to vote and which issues to prioritize based on available information. (Jones and Baumgartner 2005, Whiteman 1995, Kingdon 1989, Curry 2015). Yet, rarely do members gather this information themselves. Instead they primarily rely on staffers to filter and organize the information in memos and briefing binders that they can skim through during the few free minutes they have or on flights back to their districts. Members have little time to conduct their own information search. They must spend considerable time on fundraising, maintaining a media presence, and making themselves visible to constituents. They have little time for detailed policy inquiry or lengthy bill-drafting. Instead it is staff who do most of the hard work of policy. Staff help members make choices on which bills to introduce and co-sponsor, which issues to champion, which letters to sign, which agencies to pester, which amendments to pursue, which speeches to give. They must decide how to respond to constituent questions on a range of issues, and how to craft policy positions for public consumption.

Writing in 1979, Michael Malbin noted that "Congress could not function in todays world without the staff on which it has come to depend" (Malbin 1979, 4). Malbin quoted former Senator Dick Clark (D-Iowa) to make the point concisely: "There is no question about our enormous dependency and their influence. In all legislation, theyre the ones that lay out the options." (5) Around this time, scholars increasingly began treating congressional offices as enterprises, recognizing that way in which staff had changed the functioning of Congress (Salisbury and Shepsle 1981). Indeed, from the 1960s through the early 1980s, there was a vibrant literature on the importance of Congress staffs. A 1984 literature review essay by Susan Webb Hammond, "Legislative Staffs" found enough material to cover 48 pages in Legislative Studies Quarterly, which included eight full pages of citations. (Hammond 1984)

In the three decades since, however, scholarship on congressional staff has slowed to a trickle. Though there have been some studies of staff, the fashion has been to model members of congress as single unitary actors. This leaves little room for staff. Yet, what was true three decades ago is still true today: congressional staff remain crucial actors in how Congress functions, and how members of congress legislate. Montgomery and Nyhan (2016), for example, find that "staff play a key role in the operations of Congress and the parties, especially in facilitating the flow of expertise and policy information among members." In particular, when senior staff move between House offices, they tend to bring their legislative effectiveness capacity with them, suggesting that senior staff may be driving more legislative activity than the members themselves. Similarly, Robert Kaisers history of the Dodd-Frank bill, *Act of Congress*, is largely a story of congressional staffers making the legislation happen. (Kaiser 2013)

Even if scholarship on congressional staff did slow to a trickle from the mid-1980s through to today, the findings from the previous generation held: scholars still found that staff continue to play crucial roles in the capacity of congressional offices to operate effectively (Hall 1996, Hammond 1996, etc.); and that the most successful members of Congress are those who make the best use of their staff (DeGregorio 1995); and that staff are the key conduits of policy information. Whiteman (1995), in a study on congressional information processing, remarks on "complexity and importance of staff and their interwoven webs of information and interpretation." (1995, 189).

4 The Decline of Congressional Investment in Staff

Yet, despite the continued evidence that staff are important to the functioning of Congress, Congress has generally felt otherwise.

As of 2014, the U.S. House employed 9,175 individuals (along with 435 Members). That is fewer than the 9,341 individuals the U.S. House employed in 1980 when the demands on Congress were far less.

The Senate has increased its staffing levels from 3,913 to 5,758 during this time period, though almost all of that increase came between 1980 and 1994, when the Senate had 5,476 staff positions. Moreover, both the House and Senate have been decreasing the number of staff devoted to policy, using more staff positions to handle constituent work and press, where the demands have increased tremendously.

The most notable declines have been in committee staff. This is particularly problematic, because committees are where the substantive work of policy development and oversight happen. The declines in committee staffing have been especially striking in the House, where committees are now at about half of their 1980 staffing levels. The last few years have been especially notable in the decline in salaries. Consider the following changes between 2009 and 2013, based on CRS reports (Salaries are listed in constant dollars).

In the House:

- Median pay for House "Counsel" positions declined from $74,925 to $59,555, down 20 percent.
- Median pay for House "Legislative Director" positions declined from $93,013 to $81,177, down 13 percent.
- Median pay for House "Legislative Assistant" positions declined from $55,643 to $48,622, down 13 percent.

In the Senate:

- Median pay for Senate "Counsel" positions declined from $98,063 to $84,424, down 14 percent.
- Median pay for Senate "Legislative Director" positions declined from $148,288 to $131,912, down 11 percent.
- Median pay for Senate "Legislative Assistant" positions declined from $72,859 to $66,606 down 9 percent.

Even those in the top 90 percent of salaries in personal congressional offices are barely at $100,000. Median salaries in member offices are consistently below $50,000. Committee staff earn more, but even those in the top 90 percent are only earning about $160,000, which is what a first-year associate at a Washington law firm earns. Since Washington is one of the most expensive cities in which to live, this money does not go far.

By contrast, Drutman and Furnas (2014) found that the median revenue a former government staffer who became a lobbyist generated in 2012 was $300,000. This is a good proxy for salary, since lobbyists tend to be compensated based on the business they bring in. Those with solid committee experience, however, should expect to earn well above this median.

When offices lack adequate staffing capacity, members are often at the mercy of outside forces, most significantly corporate lobbyists (Drutman 2015). Relatedly, Hertel-Fernandez (2016) has shown that that legislators in states with less legislative capacity are more likely to recycle model legislation provided to them from an external source, ALEC. As turnover increases, staff have to constantly re-learn issues, diminishing the offices effective capacity. Malbins 1979 book had a similar warning: "Without its staff, Congress would quickly become the prisoner of its outside sources of information in the executive branch and interest groups." (Malbin, 1979, 5).

Equally consequential is that institutional knowledge is lost every time a position turns over. Congressional procedures are complex, and take time to master. If staff are constantly coming and going, it becomes difficult for members to remember how they handled issues in the process. If staff turnover every few years, what happens to reauthorizations that take place every five years? Each process means a new cadre of staffers having to start from scratch, and/or to rely on some former staffer-turned-lobbyist to guide them through the process.

As Whiteman (1995, 82) noted: "Perhaps the most significant consequence of recent turnover is the debilitating effect it has on institutional memory... Enterprises often depend on committee staff to provide historical context for legislative activity, but even this source is quite fragile." Moreover, Whiteman wrote, "senior personal staff often complain that theres no legislative history here - sometimes the same type of bills coming back at you, and people act like its the first time." (82).

Finally, high turnover makes it difficult for congressional offices to follow through. Staffers might take initiative on a particular piece of legislation, building coalitions and network, preparing hearings, and all the other meandering steps. But if that staffer then leaves her current position, her efforts are likely to fall apart. No new staffer will have the same relationships; no new staffer will have the same detailed knowledge of the issue; no new staffer will have the understanding of the compromises that were worked out in assembling the particular coalition. All of this suggests that high staff turnover could be one reason why congress has been so unproductive of late.

To summarize concisely: Staff are important. High turnover means inexperienced staff who don't stay long. This means staff rely on lobbyists and other outside actors. It means they don't have the long time horizons to build networks and see legislative priorities through. It means they lack institutional knowledge to get things done.

Therefore, if Congress is to work better, improving staff retention should be of paramount concern. Thus, our study focuses on attempting to explain staff turnover. If we are able to identify particular factors that contribute to poor job satisfaction, it may be possible for Congress to pass internal reforms to address these issues, or particular congressional offices to engage in better practices designed to ameliorate sub-par circumstances.

5 Data

In this paper we use data from a Congressional Management Foundation (CMF) survey. CRM describes their methodology:

> For this research, 10,983 employees in House and Senate personal offices were contacted to participate in the survey. A total of 1,432 responses were received, yielding a response rate of 15%. Of these respondents: 72% were employed in the U.S. House of Representatives and 28% worked in the U.S. Senate; 55% were employed by Democrats, 43% worked for Republicans, and 2% worked for Independents. Data collection for the congressional staff survey took place August 8 October 4, 2011.

We select a subset of CMF respondents for analysis by excluding those that listed "District or State office" as their primary office location. This gives us 407 respondents, 359 of which responded to the question we use as our primary dependent variable throughout this analysis:

> How likely is it that you will, by choice, look for a job outside of your current office in the next 12 months?

We build on the descriptive work done by the CMF by highlighting this key subset of Congressional staffers that serve as important repositories of institutional knowledge

Figure 1:



and human capital in the halls of Congress. We explore several hypotheses regarding the factors that may be associated with respondents' decisions whether to search for alternate employment, including compensation, workload and workplace environment. We approach these hypotheses primarily by constructing matching subsets within the population and detailing their differences in their reported likelihood to leave. We also report several multivariate analyses of likelihood to leave using both OLS and ordinal logistic regressions in the full D.C. staffer subset as well as within matched and weighted subset of the data.

5.0.1 Basic descriptive analysis

An initial observation from the data is that we see that likelihood of leaving increases up to about year 3, then starts to decline. Presumably this is because people who are tempted to leave are most likely to be gone after 3 years. Those who make it past this threshold are those who are truly dedicated to working in Congress. Among survey respondents, the median tenure of a staffer in the DC office is 3.5 years.

The most obvious puzzle that emerges from an initial descriptive look at the data is that there is a deep conflict between the psychological rewards of working in congress

and the financial rewards of working in congress.

Looking at factors cited by staff as significant reasons for staying in their current job, we see an obvious tension. Generally, staffers like the work. Overwhelming majorities say that "I believe what Im doing is meaningful," that "I get a sense of accomplishment from my work" and that "My work is challenging and interesting," Most like the "prestige" and the "influence" as well. Working in Congress is exciting.

Table 1:

Factor significant in your decision to stay in current job	percentage indicating yes	N
I believe what I'm doing is meaningful	91	400
I enjoy the varied/fast-paced work	90	400
Dedication to public service	89	404
My work is challenging and interesting	88	401
I enjoy working for my Member/Senator and with my colleagues	87	403
I get a sense of accomplishment from my work	87	401
I like being able to influence public policy	86	397
Desire to help people	86	402
I strongly believe in my Member's/Senator's vision	85	405
I think it will be good for my career path/resume	79	401
I like the prestige of working for a Member of Congress/Senator	74	401
Desire to serve my state/district	69	402
Benefits	66	403
Compensation (salary and bonuses)	24	402

Looked at another way: Job satisfaction is high among Congressional staffers in D.C (45.9% say they are "Somewhat Satisfied" and 29.1% say they are "Very Satisfied"), but most people who work in Washington DC congressional offices say they are either likely (26.4%) or very likely (35.9%)to leave. While the two are reasonably well correlated (Spearman rho = -0.568), that actually seems pretty low. As the figure below shows, a surprising number of people who report being satisfied with their jobs say they are also likely to leave. This suggests a puzzle: why would people simultaneously be very satisfied with their job but want to leave it? We will delve more deeply into this puzzle in the pages ahead.

6 Hypotheses

6.1 Compensation

As discussed above, salaries for congressional staffers are generally quite low, especially given the generally high cost of living in Washington. Moreover, staffers can typically earn at least twice their congressional salary by taking a job in the private sector, often as a lobbyist. (Drutman and Furnas, 2014) In a study of House turnover rates, Drutman (2012) finds a small correlation between congressional office spending and retention rate, suggesting that offices that spend more money on staff retain staff at a higher rate.

Figure 2:


Relationship between satisfaction and likelihood to leave
Reported likelihood to leave
Very likely
Likely
Unlikely
Very unlikely
Very dissatisfied
Somewhat dissatisfied
Neutral/Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied
Somewhat satisfied
Very satisfied
Respondent job satisfaction
count
50
40
30
20
10

Generally, D.C. staffers are not particularly satisfied with compensation. Only 33.5 percent are satisfied with overall compensation, as compared to 44.75 percent who are dissatisfied. And only 11.5 percent say they are "very satisfied".[1] A higher percentage of staff are dissatisfied by this issue than almost any other. Notably, the one issue with the highest dissatisfaction rate is the "Annual cost of living adjustments," with 46.6 percent of D.C. respondents saying they are dissatisfied, while only 23 percent say their are satisfied.

As one House communications director put it in the survey, "We work for demanding bosses. The best and brightest will not continue to do this work without better pay. I am paid a somewhat comfortable salary, but combined with the high cost of living in D.C., I'll never be able to buy a house or feel like I can really save money. I want to be a part of Congress, but public service satisfaction only goes so far."

Our general expectation is that the more that a staffer earns in salary, the less likely that staffer will be to depart her current job.

While this would appear the most obvious hypothesis, we do have a concern about testing this hypothesis with this survey data. Salaries in congress are inherently limited. Congressional offices have very limited budgets, and staffers do not typically earn more than members of Congress, and the pay of members of Congress is set by statute at $174,000 a year. This, again, is considerably less than staffers would earn in comparable private sector jobs, so even small raises or bonuses may be inadequate to make up the difference.

Put another way, while we would expect compensation to have an effect on departure, we may have a problem with our independent variable: If everybody in Congress is considerably underpaid, we may not have enough variation at the individual level to predict whether adequate or excellent compensation improves retention because so few individuals receive anything close to this. If even the most highly-paid staffers are under-compensated, it may be difficult to directly test whether adequate compensation would do a better job of retaining staff.

It may also be the case that those who choose to work in Congress understand at the outset that they are taking a pay cut in order to do work that they consider highly purposive, and thus the rewards they seek from Congress are not primarily monetary, but in their ability to contribute to something much larger and beyond themselves. As one House Legislative Assistant put it in the survey, "Working in Congress means sacrificing many of the perks of the private/not-for-profit world (compensation, travel, work hours) to contribute to something greater than myself."; Another respondent, a Senate deputy communications director, noted that: "between the nasty political rancor, sometimes round-the-clock hours, and low pay, you have to really want to be a public servant. Thats why so many of us only last a few years here."

[1]Percentages reported do not include "Don't know/does not apply" in the denominators.

Within the survey, 67 percent of D.C. staffers say that the desire to earn more money was a significant factor in a decision to leave their current job/office (the highest of any factor); 53.6 percent said that a desire to increase their income was a significant factor in their decision to want to leave Congress. We also note that only 53.1 percent of staffers say that "Overall compensation/pay" is "very important to them." As we will see, this is a much lower percentage than issues around workload, work itself, and management, further evidence that staffers enter the job without expectations of making much money.

Many staffers may also view working in Congress as an investment in their future earnings, and thus view working in congress simply as something that you do for a few years, and then move on to something else. However, only 45.5 percent of respondents in the survey said that they considered "career advancement opportunities within the office" to be "very important" (relatively low, compared to other issues). This would suggest that many staffers understand that upward mobility is limited, and culture of working on the Hill is to spend a few years there, and then move on to something better.

Hypothesis 1: Staffers who are better compensated are less likely to want to leave their current position

6.2 Workload

Working in congress is a very demanding job. The work includes many long and unpredictable hours. If staffers must respond to constituents and groups, prepare policy briefings, draft legislation, write policy positions, help write speeches, and other responsibilities, all on a wide range of subject matters, this takes considerable time and effort.

Among aspects of the work environment, staffers report the highest levels of dissatisfaction with work-related stress (34.8 percent say they are dissatisfied), predictability of daily work hours (26.3 percent say they are dissatisfied), and number of hours worked per week (26.7 percent say they are dissatisfied). Staffers are considerably more satisfied with other aspects of their work environment.

Certainly, these numbers dont indicate a sense of crisis among staffers. And notably, only 39.7 percent of respondents in the survey said that "managing the amount of work-related stress" was a very important factor, and only 24 percent of respondents said that "Number of hours worked per week" was very important.

As with the money, it may also be the case that congressional staffers go into this work knowing that the job will be demanding, and that it will be something that they do for a period of time, and then move on. It may be a job that attracts ambitious hard-working people. Moreover, many staff are in their 20s and early 30s, before they have started families, when they have both time and energy to put in long hours.

Thus, it may be the case that when staffers are new and hungry, they are able and willing to put in long hours, glad for the excitement and education that the job offers. But

as they move up the ladder, the demands increase even further with added responsibility, and the excitement and enthusiasm fades as burn-out sets in.

Staffers may also find themselves comparing the hours they work to the hours their friends in other Washington jobs work, such as journalism, lawyering, and advocacy. Since Washington is home to many ambitious politicos, long hours are part of the larger DC culture, staffers may be less concerned about the long hours.

Hypothesis 2: Staffers who feel less over-worked are less likely to want to leave their current position.

6.3 Impactful Work

While congressional staffers may complain mightily about various aspects of their work, many are drawn to it because they feel that they have an ability to make a powerful impact on the world. There are few jobs with as much direct opportunity for large scale power or influence. Staffers get to shape the laws for the entire nation.

Notably, 71 percent of D.C. respondents said that the "meaningfulness of job" was important for them; likewise, 61.5 percent said that the "job itself" was important to them. Interestingly 67.9 percent of respondents in the survey said that they were satisfied with the "meaningfulness of job" and 67.9 percent said that they were satisfied with the "job itself"

This idealism and these feelings of importance may attract and sustain many congressional staffers. But the last several years have been exceptionally rancorous and unproductive sessions of Congress. Little legislation has been passed into law, as bitter partisan divisions have created an environment hostile to legislative productivity.

Staffers may work long hours trying to develop and advance legislation with great hopes. But if their efforts are repeatedly met with failure, they may become disappointed or disenchanted. The intrinsic value of the work might evaporate. And without that, the sacrifices staffers might otherwise make will no longer seem worthwhile.

Hypothesis 3: Once staffers become disenchanted with the work itself, little else will keep them in the job

6.4 Work Environment

As noted above, turnover varies considerably by office. This suggests that almost certainly, management has something to do with turnover. Put simply, some members of Congress are good managers who treat their staffers well and make them feel valued; other members are demanding and capricious managers who make work particularly unpleasant. In comparing turnover rates across offices, Drutman (2012) noted that members of Congress with the highest rates of office turnover were often widely known to be poor managers.

In the survey, staffers generally consider management to be an important factor. Among the work environment factors, 75.7 percent of D.C. respondents rated "Overall office culture" as "very important", making it the most important work environment factor. Additionally, 69.5 percent of respondents said that the "Communication between employees and senior management" was important to them. Overall, 64 percent of respondents reported being satisfied with the overall office culture. But only 50 percent reported being satisfied with the communication between employees and senior management. Additionally, 56.4 percent of respondents agreed that "Overall, my office is well managed"

Hypothesis 4: A well-managed office can reduce the likelihood of staffers looking to leave.

7 Results

In the CMF survey salary is reported in $10,000 buckets ranging from "Less than $10,000" to "$160,000 or more." To evaluate the impact of compensation we begin by estimating an ordinal logistic regression model of salary and using the difference between the predicted salary category of a respondent and their reported salary category as a measure of whether they were "over" or "under" paid in expectation. The results of the full salary model are reported in the Appendix and has a Nagelkerke (1991) Pseudo R-squared of 0.682. While we should be careful not to over-interpret a goodness of fit measure of this kind, it is worth noting that the salary model does indeed explain considerable variance. The performance of the model's predicted versus actual salary is shown in the figure below.

We used these results to construct a tripartite classification of respondents as earning "more than expected," "as expected," or "less than expected." Any respondent whose predicted salary category was within one ordinal bin from their actual reported salary was considered as earning "as expected." According to our hypothesis those earning considerably more than expected should be less likely to leave, while those earning less than expected should be more likely to leave *ceteris paribus*.

Out of the total 322 D.C. staffers with complete enough responses to estimate the salary model, we end up with the following classification:

Table 2:

Earns more than expected	earns as expected	earns less than expected
87	199	36

We then matched units between the "more than expected" and "as expected" earning categories using nearest neighbor matching without replacement on the latent salary variable from the model, as well as hours worked in and out of session, whether or not

Figure 3:


Estimation of over/under payment
Predicted respondent salary category
$160,000 or more
$130,000 – $139,000
$100,000 – $109,000
$90,000 – $99,000
$80,000 – $89,000
$70,000 – $79,000
$60,000 – $69,000
$50,000 – $59,000
$40,000 – $49,000
$30,000 – $39,000
$20,000 – $29,000
$30,000 – $39,000
$40,000 – $49,000
$50,000 – $59,000
$60,000 – $69,000
$70,000 – $79,000
$80,000 – $89,000
$90,000 – $99,000
$100,000 – $109,000
$110,000 – $119,000
$120,000 – $129,000
$130,000 – $139,000
$140,000 – $149,000
$150,000 – $159,000
$160,000 or more
Respondent salary category
count
60
40
20

Figure 4:



the respondent received a raise or bonus the previous year and the respondents' level of education. Across the 49 covariates for which we tested balance the difference in means between the more than expected and control was insignificant at the .05 level for all age, where respondents that earned more than expected were about half a year older than those earning the amount expected.

When comparing the reported likeliness to leave among those earning more than our salary model predicts to those earning about the same as our salary model predicts, we some notable differences weighted chi-squared statistic of 4.207 and a p value of 0.240. We find 36 percent of those earning the expected amount reporting that they are "highly likely" to leave as compared to 28 percent of those earning more than predicted. On the other hand, 33 percent of those earning more than expected are report that they are likely to leave while 24 percent of those earning as expected report the same. This is consistent with extra earning marginally decreasing likelihood to leave.

	Very unlikely	Unlikely	Likely	Very likely
Earned more than predicted	0.18	0.21	0.33	0.28
Earned as predicted	0.28	0.13	0.24	0.36

Figure 5:



We conducted an analogous comparison looking at respondents who earned less than expected matched against those earning within one category of the salary model's prediction. Again we matched on the salary model latent variable estimate, hours worked in and out of session, bonus and raise in the previous year as well as education. Across all covariates the lowest p value on a difference of means test was 0.1. We find no statistically significant relationship between earning less than expected and reported likelihood of leaving, with a weighted chi-squared test statistic of 2.155 and a p-value of 0.540. However again, descriptively, the comparison is consistent with our expectations with those earning less than expected more often reporting that they are very likely to leave and those who earned as expected more likely to say they are very unlikely to leave. The lack of significance is not entirely unsurprising given the small sample here.

	Very unlikely	Unlikely	Likely	Very likely
Earning less than expected	0.25	0.19	0.19	0.36
Earning about as expected	0.28	0.28	0.25	0.19

In Table 12 in the appendix we report OLS regression results each on these two matched data sets on a coerced numeric form of the ordinal dependent variable. In

each case we have included a subset of important control variables that were included in the matching procedure to account for whatever imbalance may have still existed after the matching. In these models higher latent variable predicted from the salary model the less a respondent reported they were likely to leave (this was true with an alternate specification with a nominalized salary variable as well), however the salary overperform and underperfom dummy variables were inconclusive and differed depending on specification.

To further explore the relationship between compensation and likelihood of leaving, we then looked at whether a respondent received a bonus or a raise in the previous year. If increasing compensation helps retention then we should expect *ceteris paribus* that if an individual receives more compensation, either in the form of either a bonus or a raise, they should report being less likely to leave. Here we conceive of both reception of a bonus and reception of a raise in the prior year as a (non-randomly assigned) treatment. Of course this pseudo-treatment is non-randomly assigned and very likely associated with potential outcomes if, for example, bonuses and raises are given out strategically as we expect they might be. To partially correct for this issue we estimate propensity scores for receiving a bonus or a raise. We then conducted nearest neighbor matching using these propensity scores as well as reported salary, hours worked in and out of session, reception of a bonus (raise) if estimating the propensity for a raise (bonus), as well as the respondent's estimate of how much they work relative to a comparable private sector job. In doing so we are attempting to ensure that the cross group comparisons we are making between those who received a bonus (raise) or did not are comparisons of likes in so far as is possible.

Because there were more respondents that received bonuses than those that did not we matched with replacement, the result being that the 148 units that got bonuses were matched against the nearest 46 units that did not receive bonuses. Post match Balance was good on most covariates, although those receiving bonuses were more likely to have a law degree and more likely to be female.

The relationship between receiving a bonus and reported likelihood to leave is highly significant, with a weighted chi-square test statistic of 9.64 and a p value of 0.0218. A bar chart of the counts is shown below. In percentage terms, 59 percent of those who did not receive a bonus reported that they were highly likely to leave, while only 36 percent of those who received a bonus reported the same.

This procedure was repeated to compare those who received raises with those who did not. A Chi-square test statistic of 7.257 with a p=value of 0.064 is indicative of an lack of independence between these two factors, although the relationship is not clearly monotonic as the figure below shows. A higher relative proportion of respondents that received raises reported they were very likely to leave, while those who did not receive raises reported that they were likely to leave. As the table below shows, those 73% of

Figure 6:

Relationship between receiving a bonus and likeliness to leave among matched units



Figure 7:

Relationship between receiving a raise and likeliness to leave among matched units



Figure 8:



who received did not receive a raise report that they are likely or very likely to look for a new job in the next year, while 65% of those that received a raise report the same.

Table 3:

	Very Unlikely	Unlikely	Likely	Very Likely
Raise	0.19%	0.17%	0.26%	0.39%
No Raise	0.21%	0.05%	0.42%	0.31%

Table 13 in the Appendix shows multiple linear regression results on the matched data for respondents receiving raises and bonuses. These analyses help account for bias that may remain because of post-match imbalance. These results are consistent with our bivariate post-match tests of independence which were in the theoretically expected direction but did not reach conventional levels of statistical significance.

Next we examine the relationship between respondents' perceptions that they work longer hours than they would in comparable private sector jobs and their reported likelihood to leave. To begin with, the majority of D.C. based respondents report working "Far more" or "a few more" hours per week than they would if in comparable private sector jobs. In the following comparisons we will compare individuals who answered in each of these categories with those who are their closest matches in other respects but

Figure 9:



responded that they believed they worked "About the same number of hours per week." It is worth noting that we are interested in the extent to which the respondent's belief that they work more in Congress than they would in the private sector, not the actual impact of working many hours a week – so we will take particular care to match on and control for the number of hours that respondents report working.

Using a subset of the data set to include only those that reported working far more or working about the same we estimated a propensity score for working reporting working far with a logistic regression model, reported in the Appendix in table 14. Using nearest neighbor matching on only this propensity score achieved good balance on the covariates which were significant in the propensity score model, including hours in session (63.137 far more hours, 65.333 about the same) as well as hours worked out of session and tenure in current congress and position. The matched data set consists of 51 "far more" observations and 15 "about the same" observations, weighted proportionately with the number of far more matches they correspond to.

The bivariate test weighted chi-squared test of independence yielded a 9.22 test statistic with a p-value of 0.0265. The results are shown in the plot below. Matching explicitly on hours yielded substantively similar results.

Figure 10:



Showing the same comparison between those reported working far more hours and their matches that report working about the same as percentages makes this difference even more clear, as shown in table 4.

Table 4:

	Very Unlikely	Unlikely	Likely	Very Likely
Far more hours	10%	20%	22%	49%
About the same	41%	16%	24%	20%

Next we examine respondents that reported working a few more hours per week than they would expect to in similar private sector jobs. Following the same procedure as above, we get a matched dataset of 160 "few more hours" respondents and 54 appropriately weighted "about the same" respondents.

Showing the same comparison between those reported working a few more hours and their matches that report working about the same as percentages makes this difference even more clear, as shown in table 5.

A multivarite OLS regression of these two factors on reported likelihood of leaving in their respective matched datasets, however, is insufficient for us to reject the null hypotheses of no effect of a respondent's perception of working more than they would at

Table 5:

	Very Unlikely	Unlikely	Likely	Very Likely
A few more hours	17%	17%	29%	37%
About the same	09%	41%	16%	34%

a private sector job.

The data presented above in sets of matched comparisons have attempted to illustrated the association between compensation and perception of differential workload when other relevant factors are otherwise relatively comparable. These tests of hypotheses 1 and 2 are suggestive but inconclusive. Our findings thus far have been in the appropriate direction of our predictions, but have often been statistically indistinguishable from null. In the cases where the bivariate association has looked promising in the matched dataset, the effects in multivariate tests remain insignificant.

In a data set of this size appropriate comparisons are hard to come by and the balance is often imperfect, which may bias any associations found in the matched datasets. Such omitted variable bias in the (imperfectly) matched bivariate results is of particular importance as there is a high degree of collinearity between hours worked, compensation, tenure and position, all of which appear play important rolls in staffers preferences over leaving their jobs.

Multivariate ordinal logistic regression of the full D.C. area respondent dataset, however, yields results that are largely consistent with our findings. These results, shown in the first model in table 7. Dummy variables for reporting working far more or slightly more than the respondent's think that they would in the private sector are strongly associated with increased likelihood to leave, an association which is especially pronounced among junior staffers. It seems that either senior staffers are not as over-worked, have more comparable work expectations about their private sector counterparts or have factored this work differential into account. Dummy variables for earning both more and less than expected also have effects generally in directions consistent with our earlier matching results and with our expectations although again these are not statistically significant.

When we subset the respondents at the median in terms of their tenure working in congress (3.25 years), we see some differences which are shown in the second and third models in table 7.

Increase in salary is significant for junior staffers, but not senior staffers, which is consistent with the possibility of that senior staffers have already factored in their foregone higher salaries into their decisions to stay as long as they have already. Additionally, hours worked relative to the private sector are no longer significant for more experienced staffers. Again, this is consistent with the view that experienced staffers are not evaluating their decision to leave with respect to the private sector in the same way as inexperienced staffers.

Table 6:

	as.numeric(dv_likelytoleave_r)	
	Model 1	**Model 2**
farmore	0.156	
	(0.346)	
fewmore		−0.079
		(0.155)
salary_nominal	0.00001	−0.00000
	(0.00001)	(0.00000)
positionrecodePolicy_Leg_Research Positions	0.571	0.037
	(0.634)	(0.264)
positionrecodePress_Communications Positions	0.157	0.150
	(0.727)	(0.350)
positionrecodeAdmin_Support Positions	1.262	−0.026
	(0.811)	(0.307)
positionrecodeState_District Positions		−0.682
		(0.602)
q1	0.005	−0.003
	(0.016)	(0.011)
q2	−0.003	−0.004
	(0.022)	(0.013)
q33No	0.237	−0.205
	(0.646)	(0.433)
q33Yes	−0.113	−0.108
	(0.635)	(0.424)
q34No	0.156	0.674
	(0.291)	(0.426)
q34Yes		0.626
		(0.407)
race_white	0.586*	0.062
	(0.330)	(0.189)
genderFemale	−0.271	−0.325**
	(0.307)	(0.138)
congress_chamberSenate	−0.837**	−0.081
	(0.339)	(0.162)
tenure_congress	−0.096**	−0.0005
	(0.043)	(0.018)
tenure_currentposition	0.013	−0.005
	(0.076)	(0.033)
supervision_nominal	−0.020	−0.009
	(0.044)	(0.018)
ind_careerdevelopment	−0.229	−0.206*
	(0.225)	(0.115)
ind_relnmgmt	−0.165	−0.087
	(0.161)	(0.087)
ind_benefitsseb	−0.232	0.013
	(0.220)	(0.100)
ind_benefitssb2thru5	−0.044	−0.010
	(0.130)	(0.065)
ind_workenvironmentall	−0.002	−0.454***
	(0.311)	(0.137)
Constant	4.304**	5.777***
	(1.693)	(0.692)
N	66	214
R-squared	0.488	0.376
Adj. R-squared	0.244	0.300
Residual Std. Error	0.940 (df = 44)	0.940 (df = 190)
F Statistic	1.997** (df = 21; 44)	4.969*** (df = 23; 190)

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

Table 7: Full leave models, subset by experience

				dv_likelytoleave_r		
	All	**exp < 3.25yr**	**exp > 3.25yr**	**All**	**exp < 3.25yr**	**exp > 3.25yr**
nominalized salary category	−0.011	−0.240*	0.076	0.119	−0.124	0.194
	(0.076)	(0.145)	(0.100)	(0.086)	(0.158)	(0.118)
earns more than expected	−0.135	0.109	−0.339	−0.310	−0.279	0.236
	(0.317)	(0.554)	(0.442)	(0.336)	(0.591)	(0.489)
earns less than expected	0.506	0.313	0.549	0.566	0.459	0.547
	(0.458)	(0.968)	(0.548)	(0.482)	(0.976)	(0.638)
works a few more hours than private sector	0.311	0.593*	0.064	0.027	0.355	−0.385
	(0.236)	(0.341)	(0.350)	(0.254)	(0.361)	(0.407)
works far more hours than private sector	0.797**	1.464***	0.010	0.138	1.028*	−0.535
	(0.349)	(0.565)	(0.485)	(0.378)	(0.613)	(0.542)
Hrs/wk in session	−0.006	−0.020	0.002	−0.007	−0.021	0.003
	(0.015)	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.017)	(0.027)	(0.025)
Hrs/wk out of session	0.013	0.024	0.017	0.005	0.020	0.010
	(0.019)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.021)	(0.032)	(0.034)
raise	−0.127	−0.362	−0.109	0.268	0.008	0.658*
	(0.227)	(0.363)	(0.316)	(0.246)	(0.393)	(0.369)
bonus	0.091	0.581	−0.365	0.235	0.668	0.150
	(0.226)	(0.380)	(0.311)	(0.252)	(0.420)	(0.358)
tenure Congress	−0.024	0.112	−0.041	−0.049	0.040	−0.049
	(0.029)	(0.216)	(0.038)	(0.033)	(0.236)	(0.046)
tenure currentposition	−0.024	0.185	−0.034	−0.010	−0.036	−0.001
	(0.042)	(0.240)	(0.045)	(0.048)	(0.289)	(0.055)
age	−0.022	0.048	−0.030	−0.027	0.045	−0.028
	(0.018)	(0.036)	(0.023)	(0.019)	(0.039)	(0.028)
Management Positions	0.292	1.469*	0.130	0.116	0.903	0.089
	(0.420)	(0.860)	(0.502)	(0.445)	(0.862)	(0.582)
Policy_Leg_Research Positions	0.193	1.440	−0.001	−0.028	0.853	−0.218
	(0.528)	(0.995)	(0.783)	(0.575)	(1.025)	(0.922)
Press_Communications Positions	0.228	1.517	−0.127	0.202	0.926	0.159
	(0.485)	(0.931)	(0.664)	(0.519)	(0.945)	(0.774)
State_District Positions	−0.880	1.100	−0.191	−1.091	0.844	−0.420
	(1.099)	(1.708)	(1.697)	(1.174)	(1.737)	(1.729)
supervision nominal	−0.039	−0.018	−0.051	−0.068*	−0.078	−0.049
	(0.035)	(0.063)	(0.046)	(0.037)	(0.064)	(0.053)
Senate	−0.294	−0.021	−0.536	−0.184	0.307	−0.365
	(0.241)	(0.365)	(0.359)	(0.263)	(0.407)	(0.402)
ind_careerdevelopment				−0.307	−0.220	−0.204
				(0.195)	(0.306)	(0.286)
ind_relnmgmt				−0.256*	−0.276	−0.295
				(0.155)	(0.238)	(0.228)
ind_compensation				−0.278**	−0.043	−0.503**
				(0.140)	(0.212)	(0.212)
ind_benefitsseb				0.038	0.112	−0.083
				(0.162)	(0.231)	(0.262)
ind_benefitssb2thru5				0.032	0.089	0.001
				(0.111)	(0.170)	(0.164)
ind_workenvironmentall				−0.881***	−0.908**	−1.281***
				(0.251)	(0.366)	(0.381)
N	332	167	165	326	164	162
Log Likelihood	−424.106	−194.432	−213.302	−365.497	−174.185	−173.278

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

Staffers with little Congressional experience, but managerial positions are significantly more likely to report intentions to leave, suggesting perhaps limited "tours of duty" as Congressional senior staff for people with considerable private sector managerial experience.

When we add several indexes for factors which respondents report as important to them to the models (columns 4-6), the results stay largely the same. It does appear as though raises are a more important consideration for senior staffers while junior staffers may respond more strongly to bonuses although these effects are only weakly significant at the $p < 0.1$ level.

Consistent across all models, and indeed present many of the in the multivariate models on our previous matched datasets as well, is the finding that the index we constructed based on how respondents rate their work environment is significantly associated with a lower reported likelihood of leaving. While not a comprehensive test of the hypotheses, the importance of work environment over other features in these data is consistent with the expectations of hypotheses 3 and 4. While the work environment index is comprised of respondents' overall satisfaction with their office on multiple questions in a manner that speaks both to whether work in the office feels impactful[2] and whether the office is itself well managed[3], the relationship management index (`ind_relnmgmt`) addresses at least part of hypotheses four directly. For example, this index includes respondents' satisfaction with "Recognition by management about your job performance (feedback, incentives, rewards)," their satisfaction with their "Relationship with immediate supervisor," and "Clarity about your role and responsibilities."

To address hypotheses 3 and 4 more directly we estimate two sets of models, replacing the `ind_relnmgmt` and `ind_workenvironmentall` indexes respectively. In each case we continue to estimate the models separately on the full set of D.C respondents as well as on the subset by level of experience working in Congress.

Models in columns 1-3 of table 8 replace the `ind_relnmgmt` index with three separate survey questions which ask about respondents level of satisfaction with "Communication between employees and senior management," "Recognition by management about your job performance (feedback, incentives, rewards)," and their "Relationship with immediate supervisor." The measures were then dichotomized such that any "Very dissatisfied" and "Somewhat dissatisfied" take on a value of 1 and all other responses take on 0. While questions are not independent the kendall's rank correlations between them range from .32 to .45 they are not highly collinear. Hypothesis 4 would lead us to expect dissatisfaction in these responses to be associated with increased reported likelihood to leave. These features tend to be the most significant among junior staffers, chief among them their

[2]e.g. "Meaningfulness of job (understanding how your job contributes to society as a whole)", "The contribution your work has on the overall goals of the office"

[3]e.g. "Overall office culture (offices reputation, work ethics, values, working conditions, etc.)", "Vision and goals of Senator/Representative"

relationship with their direct supervisor. Those with more experience appear to place a greater emphasis on receiving recognition from senior management. These findings support and add some nuance to the predictions from hypothesis 4.

We followed the same procedure for three questions about work environment in which respondents expressed their level of satisfaction with the"meaningfulness of job (understanding how your job contributes to society as a whole)," "The work itself (it is interesting, challenging, exciting, etc.)," and "The contribution your work has on the overall goals of the office." These were coded dichotomously in reverse of the relationship with management such that the variable took a 1 when respondents reported being "Very satisfied" or "Somewhat satisfied." Hypothesis 3 predicts that satisfaction in having impactful work will be associated with a lower reported likelihood of leaving.

These results are reported in columns 4-6 of 8 we find results which are statistically significant and supportive of the expectations of our hypotheses. Reporting satisfaction with the work itself and with ones contributions to the goals of the office are associated with lower reported likelihood of leaving. Interestingly we there are differences here between senior and junior staffers as well. Those with less experience are more concerned with satisfaction with the work itself while more experienced staffers are more oriented towards the office as a whole.

Finally we re-estimate the same models but adding in respondents ratings of the importance of the 3 separate factors which have replaced the indexes. We dichotomized the importance variable, such that it takes a 1 if the respondent rated the factor as "Very important" and 0 otherwise. We have no prediction for the direct effect of importance, but we expect the overall effect of (dis)satisfaction to be stronger among those who rate the feature as very important than it is among those who do not. We find mixed support for this importance hypotheses as 9 shows.

The findings presented in this paper are largely consistent with the expectations of our hypotheses. In the matching analyses we see associations in the expected direction for earning more and less than expected, receiving bonuses and raises, and working longer hours than respondents believe their private sector counterparts would. Multivarate models of multiple specifications tend to bear this out. However, in many of these cases effects fall shy of conventional bounds of statistical significance. In some cases this may be the result of relatively small samples in the matched subsets, but often we expect, this may be related to selection bias inherent in the data. Individuals that could have been persuaded to stay by higher salaries or bonuses may, in many cases, have already opted out by seeking employment elsewhere. This selection bias would tend to attenuate these sorts of findings.

Finally, the importance of satisfaction with the work environment, both in terms of a feeling of meaningful and impactful work and in terms of being satisfied with one's relationship with their supervisors is consistently evident. These results suggest particularly

Table 8: Likelihood to leave models with direct effects for work environment and relationship with management

	dv likelytoleave r					
	All	**exp < 3.25yr**	**exp > 3.25yr**	**All**	**exp < 3.25yr**	**exp > 3.25yr**
nominalized salary category	0.127	−0.145	0.223*	0.097	−0.113	0.182
	(0.087)	(0.161)	(0.120)	(0.087)	(0.159)	(0.121)
earns more than expected	−0.385	−0.208	0.111	−0.113	−0.051	0.130
	(0.338)	(0.598)	(0.494)	(0.342)	(0.593)	(0.502)
earns less than expected	0.435	0.223	0.452	0.463	0.341	0.558
	(0.490)	(0.993)	(0.647)	(0.481)	(0.974)	(0.617)
Works a few more hrs/wk than private sector	0.068	0.382	−0.303	0.074	0.314	−0.271
	(0.256)	(0.366)	(0.415)	(0.252)	(0.363)	(0.399)
Works far more hrs/wk than private sector	0.211	0.976	−0.441	0.399	1.018*	−0.101
	(0.381)	(0.611)	(0.551)	(0.375)	(0.612)	(0.535)
Hrs/wk in session	−0.005	−0.010	0.005	0.003	−0.006	0.007
	(0.017)	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.017)	(0.026)	(0.025)
Hrs/wk out of session	0.006	0.016	0.015	0.0005	0.006	0.011
	(0.021)	(0.031)	(0.034)	(0.021)	(0.031)	(0.034)
raise	0.291	0.098	0.617*	0.392	0.290	0.564
	(0.247)	(0.398)	(0.375)	(0.248)	(0.413)	(0.364)
bonus	0.239	0.670	0.191	0.180	0.493	0.109
	(0.252)	(0.425)	(0.361)	(0.254)	(0.425)	(0.365)
tenure Congress	−0.048	0.101	−0.045	−0.045	0.138	−0.034
	(0.033)	(0.240)	(0.047)	(0.033)	(0.234)	(0.046)
tenure currentposition	−0.011	−0.072	−0.0003	−0.011	0.049	−0.015
	(0.048)	(0.306)	(0.055)	(0.047)	(0.288)	(0.054)
age2	−0.027	0.050	−0.029	−0.019	0.058	−0.034
	(0.019)	(0.039)	(0.028)	(0.019)	(0.039)	(0.027)
Management Positions	0.087	0.861	0.129	0.134	0.688	0.184
	(0.447)	(0.865)	(0.576)	(0.443)	(0.877)	(0.574)
Policy Leg Research Positions	−0.009	0.803	0.046	0.185	0.956	−0.209
	(0.577)	(1.038)	(0.937)	(0.572)	(1.039)	(0.912)
Press comm. Positions	0.236	0.943	0.115	0.036	0.575	0.134
	(0.521)	(0.946)	(0.773)	(0.515)	(0.976)	(0.749)
State District Positions	−1.001	1.181	−0.248	−0.803	1.027	−0.268
	(1.185)	(1.738)	(1.856)	(1.150)	(1.798)	(1.788)
supervision nominal	−0.070*	−0.082	−0.050	−0.053	−0.067	−0.044
	(0.038)	(0.064)	(0.053)	(0.038)	(0.065)	(0.053)
Senate	−0.235	0.369	−0.491	−0.386	0.074	−0.603
	(0.265)	(0.412)	(0.410)	(0.264)	(0.401)	(0.415)
ind careerdevelopment	−0.273	−0.199	−0.116	−0.399**	−0.148	−0.453*
	(0.185)	(0.292)	(0.275)	(0.189)	(0.315)	(0.272)
ind relnmgmt				−0.375**	−0.553**	−0.354
				(0.153)	(0.237)	(0.226)
ind compensation	−0.272*	−0.020	−0.501**	−0.266*	−0.086	−0.431**
	(0.140)	(0.215)	(0.214)	(0.139)	(0.208)	(0.215)
ind benefitsseb	0.032	0.087	−0.188	−0.071	0.039	−0.286
	(0.164)	(0.243)	(0.269)	(0.158)	(0.231)	(0.248)
ind benefitssb2thru5	0.036	0.133	−0.012	−0.011	0.090	−0.084
	(0.112)	(0.174)	(0.166)	(0.112)	(0.171)	(0.166)
ind workenvironmentall	−0.902***	−0.921**	−1.238***			
	(0.246)	(0.360)	(0.381)			
Dissat. abt comm. w/mgmt	0.398	0.508	0.608			
	(0.290)	(0.482)	(0.424)			
Dissat. abt recog. from mgmt	0.438	0.209	0.769*			
	(0.276)	(0.417)	(0.415)			
Dissat. abt rel w/supervisor	0.362	1.101**	0.016			
	(0.329)	(0.555)	(0.454)			
Satis. abt job meaning				0.313	0.289	0.247
				(0.300)	(0.461)	(0.461)
Satis. w/ job itself				−0.711**	−0.856**	−0.561
				(0.296)	(0.427)	(0.467)
Satis. w/contrib. to office				−0.644**	−0.736	−0.737*
				(0.308)	(0.467)	(0.441)
N	326	164	162	326	164	162
Log Likelihood	−362.513	−171.337	−170.348	−364.964	−172.891	−176.360

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

Table 9: Likelihood to leave models with direct effects for work environment and relationship with management and importance interactions

	dv likelytoleave r					
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**	**Model 5**	**Model 6**
nominalized salary category	0.123	−0.069	0.213*	0.111	−0.098	0.230*
	(0.087)	(0.168)	(0.121)	(0.089)	(0.167)	(0.130)
earns more than expected	−0.370	−0.319	0.230	−0.168	−0.264	−0.054
	(0.342)	(0.609)	(0.509)	(0.346)	(0.633)	(0.535)
earns less than expected	0.527	0.442	0.430	0.429	0.173	0.627
	(0.497)	(1.059)	(0.658)	(0.489)	(0.982)	(0.644)
Works a few more hrs/wk than private sector	0.062	0.331	−0.268	0.067	0.166	−0.188
	(0.258)	(0.376)	(0.429)	(0.258)	(0.395)	(0.408)
Works far more hrs/wk than private sector	0.204	0.957	−0.288	0.410	0.919	−0.045
	(0.380)	(0.631)	(0.572)	(0.380)	(0.631)	(0.551)
Hrs/wk in session	−0.004	−0.005	0.010	0.003	−0.005	0.002
	(0.017)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.017)	(0.027)	(0.026)
Hrs/wk out of session	0.002	−0.002	0.011	−0.0004	0.007	0.015
	(0.022)	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.022)	(0.031)	(0.035)
raise	0.291	0.082	0.591	0.430*	0.467	0.525
	(0.249)	(0.404)	(0.383)	(0.253)	(0.435)	(0.382)
bonus	0.228	0.731*	0.179	0.169	0.466	0.096
	(0.255)	(0.438)	(0.376)	(0.257)	(0.428)	(0.374)
tenure Congress	−0.045	0.184	−0.039	−0.047	0.151	−0.051
	(0.033)	(0.244)	(0.048)	(0.033)	(0.241)	(0.049)
tenure currentposition	−0.010	0.018	−0.004	−0.007	0.035	−0.014
	(0.048)	(0.319)	(0.058)	(0.048)	(0.301)	(0.057)
age2	−0.029	0.044	−0.035	−0.023	0.059	−0.043
	(0.019)	(0.040)	(0.029)	(0.020)	(0.040)	(0.029)
Management Positions	0.119	1.074	−0.113	0.226	1.220	0.018
	(0.450)	(0.905)	(0.597)	(0.454)	(0.950)	(0.602)
Policy Leg Research Positions	0.013	0.901	−0.351	0.226	1.534	−0.565
	(0.582)	(1.089)	(0.985)	(0.581)	(1.125)	(0.952)
Press comm. Positions	0.241	1.125	−0.306	0.032	0.976	−0.110
	(0.526)	(0.984)	(0.814)	(0.524)	(1.013)	(0.785)
State District Positions	−1.069	1.067	−0.432	−0.789	1.248	−0.448
	(1.187)	(1.752)	(1.742)	(1.162)	(1.839)	(1.931)
supervision nominal	−0.069*	−0.111	−0.060	−0.049	−0.043	−0.062
	(0.038)	(0.069)	(0.054)	(0.039)	(0.069)	(0.056)
Senate	−0.250	0.174	−0.513	−0.381	0.010	−0.609
	(0.270)	(0.431)	(0.427)	(0.266)	(0.403)	(0.426)
ind careerdevelopment	−0.274	−0.343	−0.128	−0.413**	−0.176	−0.439
	(0.187)	(0.305)	(0.282)	(0.196)	(0.324)	(0.288)
ind relnmgmt				−0.354**	−0.511**	−0.296
				(0.158)	(0.244)	(0.239)
ind compensation	−0.270*	−0.106	−0.530**	−0.292**	−0.137	−0.493**
	(0.143)	(0.229)	(0.224)	(0.143)	(0.220)	(0.225)
ind benefitsseb	0.021	0.085	−0.262	−0.068	0.055	−0.255
	(0.166)	(0.250)	(0.281)	(0.160)	(0.234)	(0.262)
ind benefitssb2thru5	0.026	0.096	0.015	0.004	0.096	−0.066
	(0.113)	(0.177)	(0.172)	(0.115)	(0.175)	(0.176)
ind workenvironmentall	−0.927***	−0.787**	−1.127***			
	(0.251)	(0.400)	(0.398)			
Dissat. abt comm. w/mgmt	0.548	2.096**	0.611			
	(0.473)	(0.908)	(0.674)			
comm. w/mgmt v. import	0.109	−0.070	0.639			
	(0.310)	(0.471)	(0.513)			
Dissat. abt recog. from mgmt	0.625	0.778	0.619			
	(0.423)	(0.703)	(0.643)			
recog. from mgmt v. import	−0.032	0.629	−0.676			
	(0.292)	(0.450)	(0.507)			
Dissat. abt rel w/supervisor	0.111	0.265	−0.057			
	(0.528)	(0.840)	(0.766)			
rel w/supervisor v. import	0.134	0.391	0.127			
	(0.289)	(0.446)	(0.461)			
Dissat. abt comm. w/mgmt:comm. w/mgmt v. import	−0.213	−1.797*	0.036			
	(0.549)	(0.999)	(0.805)			
Dissat. abt recog. from mgmt:recog. from mgmt v. import	−0.257	−1.147	0.504			
	(0.520)	(0.834)	(0.787)			
Dissat. abt rel w/supervisor:rel w/supervisor v. import	0.359	1.496	0.109			
	(0.640)	(1.120)	(0.932)			
Satis. abt job meaning				0.470	0.285	0.576
				(0.448)	(0.734)	(0.693)
job meaning v. import				0.154	−0.396	0.699
				(0.465)	(0.714)	(0.694)
Satis. w/ job itself				−0.686	−0.525	−0.815
				(0.469)	(0.766)	(0.702)
job itself v. import				−0.481	−0.319	−0.846
				(0.474)	(0.712)	(0.770)
Satis. w/contrib. to office				−0.431	−0.776	−0.177
				(0.411)	(0.653)	(0.587)
contrib. to office v. import				0.880*	0.866	1.180
				(0.452)	(0.652)	(0.744)
Satis. abt job meaning:job meaning v. import				−0.297	0.105	−0.800
				(0.552)	(0.860)	(0.868)
Satis. w/ job itself:job itself v. import				0.022	−0.454	0.564
				(0.569)	(0.893)	(0.891)
Satis. w/contrib. to office:contrib. to office v. import				−0.423	−0.196	−0.965
				(0.533)	(0.806)	(0.844)
N	326	164	162	326	164	162
Log Likelihood	−361.816	−165.898	−168.529	−362.072	−171.180	−174.281

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

strong support for hypotheses 3 and 4.

8 Conclusion

We have argued here that congressional staffers play an increasingly important role in the basic functioning of Congress, and we have raised concerns that increasingly high turnover of congressional staffers may be undermining the ability of congress to function. Our primary empirical question, however, has been what might explain this turnover. To answer this question, he have turned to a survey of congressional staff conducted for the Congressional Management Foundation.

Our analysis suggests that low pay, long hours, the concerns about the lack impactful work, and poor internal office management all contribute to high staff turnover. We found the strongest effects for the lack of impactful work and internal office management. However, we expect that one reason for the more limited effects of the first two factors (low pay and long hours) is that they are already built into the expectations of staffers who choose to work on the Hill. In deciding to work in Congress, staffers know what their salary is going to be, and understand that long and unpredictable hours are part of the job. Anybody who works in Congress is willing to sacrifice money and leisure. What they hope to gain in return, generally, is the ability to have an impact on the world, to do something beyond themselves. Presumably, they also expect to be treated decently, and to work in a pleasant, even if stressful, environment.

However, if the work begins frustrating because Congress is gridlocked and dysfunctional, and staffers are treated poorly by managers, there are few other perks to make the job worthwhile. We expect that this is probably what is taking place.

Our analysis suggests that congressional offices should focus on improving internal management practices, since this appears to have a high effect on staff turnover. It is also something that congressional offices could do without considerable cost.

Our results also indicate that congressional offices would reduce staff turnover by paying staff more and/or hiring more staffers so that individual staff would each have less work. Congressional offices, however, all have limited budgets, which makes this difficult. Though they could allocate less money for other expenses (for example, travel), and spend more money on staff. Still, given the much more remunerative off-the-Hill options that congressional staff often have, salaries might need to be higher than current office budget allocations provide for. We expect that if there were more variation in staffer compensation, we would find a greater effect. However, since we don't get to really observe any instances of highly-compensated staff in our data, it is hard for us to demonstrate this for certain.

The impact of the work is certainly beyond the control of any single office, since it largely depends on the ability of Congress to overcome its internal gridlock, and to start

passing legislation again. However, we expect that congressional offices would be able to reduce staff turnover through a combination of better pay, more reasonable hours, and improved management. As staff stick around longer, congressional offices will become more productive, which will make Congress a more functional and productive institution. This will make work in Congress feel more meaningful, which will further contribute to staff retention, setting in motion of positive feedback process making Congress an ever more appealing and productive place to work. Perhaps as Congress works better, it will earn back some of the public trust, which will give it license to invest even more in its staff.

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10 Appendix

Table 10:

	salary
positionrecodePolicy_Leg_Research Positions	0.275
	(0.416)
positionrecodePress_Communications Positions	0.721
	(0.516)
positionrecodeAdmin_Support Positions	-1.684^{***}
	(0.486)
positionrecodeState_District Positions	2.448^{**}
	(0.977)
tenure_currentposition	0.040
	(0.042)
tenure_congress	0.040
	(0.032)
age2	0.127^{***}
	(0.016)
q1	0.043^{***}
	(0.014)
q2	-0.021
	(0.020)
race_white	0.517^{*}
	(0.285)
genderFemale	-0.255
	(0.218)
supervision_nominal	0.233^{***}
	(0.030)
employment_statusPart-time employee	-3.418^{**}
	(1.663)
member_partyRepublican	0.117
	(0.215)
member_partyIndependent	0.567
	(0.982)
office_locationSplit time evenly between both locations	0.417
	(0.682)
primary_officeFull committee	1.884^{*}
	(0.964)
primary_officeSubcommittee	0.153
	(1.099)
primary_officeLeadership	1.994
	(1.233)
congress_chamberSenate	0.248
	(0.238)
N	324

$^{***}p < .01$; $^{**}p < .05$; $^{*}p < .1$

Table 11:

	bonus
salary_nominal	−0.00001
	(0.00001)
q33No	−18.402
	(1483.992)
q33Yes	−17.688
	(1483.992)
positionrecodePolicy_Leg_Research Positions	0.182
	(0.628)
positionrecodePress_Communications Positions	1.022
	(0.841)
positionrecodeAdmin_Support Positions	0.177
	(0.749)
positionrecodeState_District Positions	1.388
	(1.681)
salary_over_dum	−0.137
	(0.493)
salary_under_dum	−1.202*
	(0.685)
tenure_currentposition	0.095
	(0.071)
tenure_congress	0.040
	(0.052)
age2	0.023
	(0.030)
educationSome college	−17.009
	(2399.545)
educationAssociates degree	−16.689
	(2399.545)
educationBachelors degree	−15.442
	(2399.545)
educationMasters degree	−15.948
	(2399.545)
educationLaw degree	−15.151
	(2399.545)
educationDoctorate degree	−16.208
	(2399.545)
q1	0.056**
	(0.024)
q2	−0.043
	(0.030)
time_privatesectorA few more hours per week (25% to 49% more)	1.146**
	(0.453)
time_privatesectorAbout the same number of hours per week	1.220**
	(0.539)
time_privatesectorA few less hours per week (25% to 49% less)	1.936**
	(0.836)
time_privatesectorFar fewer hours per week (50% or less)	−16.706
	(2399.545)
race_white	0.279
	(0.457)
genderFemale	0.078
	(0.331)
supervision_nominal	−0.004
	(0.051)
employment_statusPart-time employee	14.433
	(2399.545)
member_partyRepublican	−1.232***
	(0.340)
member_partyIndependent	0.084
	(1.508)
office_locationSplit time evenly between both locations	0.079
	(1.121)
primary_officeFull committee	18.343
	(1065.708)
primary_officeLeadership	0.586
	(1.337)
congress_chamberSenate	−1.462***
	(0.385)
Constant	31.727
	(2821.356)
N	253
Log Likelihood	−136.979
AIC	343.959

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

Table 12:

	as.numeric(dv_likelytoleave_r)	
	Model 1	**Model 2**
salary_overperform	0.060	
	(0.180)	
salary_underperform		−0.023
		(0.272)
salary_latent	−0.102**	−0.123**
	(0.043)	(0.049)
q1	−0.012	0.043**
	(0.014)	(0.019)
q2	0.017	−0.040
	(0.017)	(0.025)
q33No	−0.376	−0.088
	(0.558)	(0.513)
q33Yes	−0.291	−0.196
	(0.550)	(0.521)
q34No	0.581	−0.218
	(0.569)	(0.314)
q34Yes	0.608	
	(0.548)	
time_privatesectorFar more hours per week (50% or more)		−0.199
		(0.394)
time_privatesectorA few more hours per week (25% to 49% more)	−0.278	−0.304
	(0.265)	(0.456)
time_privatesectorAbout the same number of hours per week	0.058	
	(0.300)	
time_privatesectorA few less hours per week (25% to 49% less)	−0.435	0.503
	(0.746)	(0.661)
educationSome college		−0.055
		(1.157)
educationAssociates degree	−0.605	2.559*
	(0.941)	(1.354)
educationBachelors degree	−0.388	0.549
	(0.503)	(0.935)
educationMasters degree	−0.135	0.686
	(0.508)	(0.956)
educationLaw degree	−0.372	0.607
	(0.545)	(1.074)
educationDoctorate degree	0.576	0.825
	(0.867)	(1.148)
ind_careerdevelopment	0.082	−0.094
	(0.162)	(0.241)
ind_relnmgmt	−0.272**	−0.371**
	(0.135)	(0.160)
ind_benefitsseb	−0.205	−0.381*
	(0.142)	(0.215)
ind_benefitssb2thru5	−0.156	0.237*
	(0.094)	(0.124)
ind_workenvironmentall	−0.425**	−0.337
	(0.210)	(0.252)
Constant	6.978***	6.422***
	(0.964)	(1.692)
N	142	62
R-squared	0.362	0.649
Adj. R-squared	0.250	0.465
Residual Std. Error	0.978 (df = 120)	0.858 (df = 40)
F Statistic	3.242*** (df = 21; 120)	3.527*** (df = 21; 40)

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

Table 13: Raise and Bonus multivariate models on matched data

	as.numeric(dv_likelytoleave_r)	
	Model 1	**Model 2**
bonus	−0.234	
	(0.161)	
raise		0.074
		(0.171)
salary_nominal	−0.00001***	−0.00001*
	(0.00000)	(0.00000)
positionrecodePolicy_Leg_Research Positions	−0.289	0.068
	(0.223)	(0.289)
positionrecodePress_Communications Positions	−0.374	−0.149
	(0.288)	(0.361)
positionrecodeAdmin_Support Positions	−0.387	0.305
	(0.298)	(0.378)
positionrecodeState_District Positions	−1.127	1.099
	(0.908)	(0.984)
q1	−0.001	−0.001
	(0.010)	(0.011)
q2	−0.004	−0.007
	(0.014)	(0.014)
q33No	0.603	
	(0.639)	
q33Yes	0.494	
	(0.638)	
q34No		0.684**
		(0.340)
q34Yes		0.674**
		(0.326)
race_white	0.376*	0.085
	(0.203)	(0.210)
genderFemale	−0.430***	−0.386**
	(0.137)	(0.155)
congress_chamberSenate	−0.141	−0.149
	(0.176)	(0.182)
office_locationSplit time evenly between both locations	−0.841*	−0.950*
	(0.450)	(0.542)
member_partyRepublican	−0.058	−0.110
	(0.161)	(0.169)
member_partyIndependent	1.771*	−1.228
	(0.943)	(1.092)
employment_statusPart-time employee	−1.356	−1.881*
	(0.927)	(1.025)
educationSome college	1.398	0.903
	(1.045)	(1.065)
educationAssociates degree	2.045*	1.022
	(1.115)	(1.210)
educationBachelors degree	1.343	1.264
	(0.885)	(0.977)
educationMasters degree	1.240	1.167
	(0.890)	(0.986)
educationLaw degree	1.620*	1.517
	(0.912)	(1.001)
educationDoctorate degree	2.128**	1.377
	(1.055)	(1.217)
ind_careerdevelopment	0.081	−0.061
	(0.110)	(0.135)
ind_relnmgmt	−0.056	−0.138
	(0.090)	(0.105)
ind_benefitsseb	0.132	0.044
	(0.097)	(0.106)
ind_benefitssb2thru5	−0.005	−0.048
	(0.067)	(0.076)
ind_workenvironmentall	−0.793***	−0.524***
	(0.138)	(0.173)
Constant	4.779***	4.405***
	(1.349)	(1.288)
N	186	182
R-squared	0.535	0.423
Adj. R-squared	0.452	0.317
Residual Std. Error	0.847 (df = 157)	0.927 (df = 153)
F Statistic	6.456*** (df = 28; 157)	4.005*** (df = 28; 153)

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

Table 14: Propensity Score Models for far more and few more hours worked

	farmore	**fewmore**
	Model 1	**Model 2**
q1	0.300***	0.084***
	(0.081)	(0.028)
q2	−0.049	−0.079**
	(0.072)	(0.035)
q33No	−15.152	−2.266**
	(2020.421)	(0.990)
q33Yes	−15.369	−1.874**
	(2020.421)	(0.925)
q34No	18.015	2.519***
	(2020.421)	(0.923)
q34Yes	16.860	2.630***
	(2020.421)	(0.906)
positionrecodePolicy_Leg_Research Positions	−0.659	0.008
	(1.956)	(0.713)
positionrecodePress_Communications Positions	−0.124	−0.002
	(2.201)	(0.893)
positionrecodeAdmin_Support Positions	−0.866	−1.004
	(2.065)	(0.774)
positionrecodeState_District Positions	−12.479	0.612
	(4289.932)	(1.288)
tenure_currentposition	−0.488**	−0.194**
	(0.233)	(0.080)
tenure_congress	0.253**	0.068
	(0.121)	(0.054)
age2	−0.016	0.007
	(0.059)	(0.027)
educationSome college		−12.738
		(882.746)
educationAssociates degree	−23.448	−11.126
	(6522.648)	(882.746)
educationBachelors degree	1.263	−12.491
	(2.227)	(882.745)
educationMasters degree	1.465	−12.963
	(2.389)	(882.745)
educationLaw degree	−1.561	−13.087
	(2.912)	(882.745)
educationDoctorate degree	−3.663	−13.397
	(10.658)	(882.746)
race_white	−2.065**	0.397
	(1.025)	(0.474)
genderFemale	0.416	−0.136
	(0.754)	(0.340)
supervision_nominal	−0.222	0.044
	(0.138)	(0.049)
member_partyRepublican	−0.748	−0.168
	(0.717)	(0.359)
member_partyIndependent	−0.809	2.862
	(10.193)	(1.827)
congress_chamberSenate	−0.961	−0.798**
	(0.807)	(0.371)
Constant	−28.443	12.482
	(3059.490)	(882.746)
Fixed effects (not reported)	Salary Bin	Salary Bin
N	141	250
Log Likelihood	−41.173	−131.929
AIC	160.346	343.857

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

Table 15: Salary Overperform Balance Results

	Median eCFD Difference
positionrecodePolicy_Leg_Research Positions	0.047649
positionrecodePress_Communications Positions	0.0062696
positionrecodeAdmin_Support Positions	0.012853
positionrecodeState_District Positions	0.011494
tenure_currentposition	0.036364
tenure_congress	0.049739
age2	0.058098
educationSome college	0.0081505
educationAssociates degree	0.0033438
educationBachelors degree	0.031348
educationMasters degree	0.07837
educationLaw degree	0.039812
educationDoctorate degree	0.0024033
hrs/wk in session	0.016301
hrs/wk out of session	0.030512
raiseNo	0.016092
raiseYes	0.0092999
bonusNo	0.022675
bonusYes	0.014629
time_privatesectorA few more hours per week (25% to 49% more)	0.026541
time_privatesectorAbout the same number of hours per week	0.032184
time_privatesectorA few less hours per week (25% to 49% less)	0.0024033
time_privatesectorFar fewer hours per week (50% or less)	0
race_white	0.011076
genderFemale	0.0088819
supervision_nominal	0.018182
employment_statusPart-time employee	0
employment_statusTemporary employee	0
employment_statusShared employee	0
member_partyRepublican	0.025183
member_partyIndependent	0.0024033
member_partyNot applicable	0
office_locationDistrict or State office	0
office_locationSplit time evenly between both locations	0.012435
primary_officeFull committee	0.0057471
primary_officeSubcommittee	0.0090909
primary_officeLeadership	0.011494
primary_officeInstitutional Support (e.g. Sergeant at Arms, CAO, Legisla	0
primary_officeLegislative Branch Support (e.g. CBO, LOC, AOC)	0
primary_officeOther	0
congress_chamberSenate	0.0020899
congress_chamberBoth	0
congress_chamberNeither	0
salary_latent	0.056635
ind_careerdevelopment	0.024451
ind_relnmgmt	0.067712
ind_benefitsseb	0.044305
ind_benefitssb2thru5	0.042738
ind_workenvironmentall	0.038245

Table 16: Salary Overperform Balance Results

	Median eCDF Difference
salary_nominal	0.16667
salary_latent	0.096154
positionrecodeManagement Positions	0.014957
positionrecodePolicy_Leg_Research Positions	0.021368
positionrecodePress_Communications Positions	0.050214
positionrecodeState_District Positions	0.027778
tenure_currentposition	0.041667
tenure_congress	0.027778
age2	0.051282
educationSome college	0.010684
educationAssociates degree	0.013889
educationBachelors degree	0.049145
educationMasters degree	0.0010684
educationLaw degree	0.022436
educationDoctorate degree	0.008547
hrs/wk in session	0.05235
hrs/wk out of session	0.053419
raiseNo	0.076923
raiseYes	0.051282
bonusNo	0.017094
bonusYes	0.008547
time_privatesectorFar more hours per week (50% or more)	0.019231
time_privatesectorA few more hours per week (25% to 49% more)	0.0010684
time_privatesectorA few less hours per week (25% to 49% less)	0.016026
time_privatesectorFar fewer hours per week (50% or less)	0
race_white	0.025641
genderFemale	0.08547
supervision_nominal	0.023504
employment_statusPart-time employee	0
employment_statusTemporary employee	0
employment_statusShared employee	0
member_partyRepublican	0.03953
member_partyIndependent	0.013889
member_partyNot applicable	0
office_locationDistrict or State office	0
office_locationSplit time evenly between both locations	0.029915
primary_officeFull committee	0.027778
primary_officeSubcommittee	0
primary_officeLeadership	0.013889
primary_officeInstitutional Support (e.g. Sergeant at Arms, CAO, Legisla	0
primary_officeLegislative Branch Support (e.g. CBO, LOC, AOC)	0
primary_officeOther	0
congress_chamberSenate	0.021368
congress_chamberBoth	0
congress_chamberNeither	0
ind_careerdevelopment	0.036325
ind_relnmgmt	0.034188
ind_benefitsseb	0.03953
ind_benefitssb2thru5	0.07265
ind_workenvironmentall	0.04594

Table 17: Bonus Balance Results

	Median eCDF Difference
salary_nominal	0.015217
positionrecodePolicy_Leg_Research Positions	0.003882
positionrecodePress_Communications Positions	0.0063665
positionrecodeAdmin_Support Positions	0.0024845
positionrecodeState_District Positions	0.0035714
tenure_currentposition	0.045497
time_privatesectorA few more hours per week (25% to 49% more)	0.0068323
time_privatesectorAbout the same number of hours per week	0.01646
time_privatesectorA few less hours per week (25% to 49% less)	0.010248
time_privatesectorFar fewer hours per week (50% or less)	0
tenure_congress	0.039752
age2	0.070497
educationSome college	0.014596
educationAssociates degree	0.0071429
educationBachelors degree	0.064286
educationMasters degree	0.092081
educationLaw degree	0.031832
educationDoctorate degree	0.00015528
hrs/wk in session	0.030124
hrs/wk out of session	0.036646
raiseNo	0.079037
raiseYes	0.071894
race_white	0.013354
genderFemale	0.082609
supervision_nominal	0.046273
employment_statusPart-time employee	0.0035714
employment_statusTemporary employee	0
employment_statusShared employee	0
member_partyRepublican	0.059938
member_partyIndependent	0.0072981
member_partyNot applicable	0
office_locationDistrict or State office	0
office_locationSplit time evenly between both locations	0.00015528
primary_officeFull committee	0.010714
primary_officeSubcommittee	0
primary_officeLeadership	0.0035714
primary_officeInstitutional Support (e.g. Sergeant at Arms, CAO, Legisla	0
primary_officeLegislative Branch Support (e.g. CBO, LOC, AOC)	0
primary_officeOther	0
congress_chamberSenate	0.045186
congress_chamberBoth	0
congress_chamberNeither	0
ind_careerdevelopment	0.035093
ind_relnmgmt	0.013509
ind_benefitsseb	0.16087
ind_benefitssb2thru5	0.12547
ind_workenvironmentall	0.036957

Table 18: Raise Balance Results

	Median eCDF Difference
salary_nominal	0.031836
positionrecodePolicy_Leg_Research Positions	0.051615
positionrecodePress_Communications Positions	0.015682
positionrecodeAdmin_Support Positions	0.017494
positionrecodeState_District Positions	0.0037037
tenure_currentposition	0.02963
tenure_congress	0.030575
age2	0.039874
educationSome college	0.013396
educationAssociates degree	0.0069346
educationBachelors degree	0.013239
educationMasters degree	0.0096139
educationLaw degree	0.005595
educationDoctorate degree	0.0074074
hrs/wk in session	0.030575
hrs/wk out of session	0.02963
bonusNo	0.042396
bonusYes	0.034043
time_privatesectorA few more hours per week (25% to 49% more)	0.0081166
time_privatesectorAbout the same number of hours per week	0.023483
time_privatesectorA few less hours per week (25% to 49% less)	0.0051221
time_privatesectorFar fewer hours per week (50% or less)	0.0037037
race_white	0.011032
genderFemale	0.013239
supervision_nominal	0.0047281
employment_statusPart-time employee	0.0037037
employment_statusTemporary employee	0
employment_statusShared employee	0
member_partyRepublican	0.0001576
member_partyIndependent	0.0037037
member_partyNot applicable	0
office_locationDistrict or State office	0
office_locationSplit time evenly between both locations	0.00047281
primary_officeFull committee	0.014815
primary_officeSubcommittee	0.0037037
primary_officeLeadership	0.0074074
primary_officeInstitutional Support (e.g. Sergeant at Arms, CAO, Legisla	0
primary_officeLegislative Branch Support (e.g. CBO, LOC, AOC)	0
primary_officeOther	0
congress_chamberSenate	0.036407
congress_chamberBoth	0
congress_chamberNeither	0
ind_careerdevelopment	0.07502
ind_relnmgmt	0.062727
ind_benefitsseb	0.019937
ind_benefitssb2thru5	0.03617
ind_workenvironmentall	0.020489

Table 19: Few more hours Balance Results

	Median eCDF Difference
positionrecodePolicy_Leg_Research Positions	0.03125
positionrecodePress_Communications Positions	0.0099537
positionrecodeAdmin_Support Positions	0.036227
positionrecodeState_District Positions	0.0030093
tenure_currentposition	0.049306
tenure_Congress	0.016667
age2	0.036574
educationSome college	0.00011574
educationAssociates degree	0.0030093
educationBachelors degree	0.0070602
educationMasters degree	0.0012731
educationLaw degree	0.0055556
educationDoctorate degree	0.0030093
hrs/wk in session	0.052431
hrs/wk out of session	0.05625
bonusNo	0.0072917
bonusYes	0.030787
raiseNo	0.031829
raiseYes	0.036806
race_white	0.026968
genderFemale	0.028125
supervision_nominal	0.010417
employment_statusPart-time employee	0
employment_statusTemporary employee	0
employment_statusShared employee	0
member_partyRepublican	0.0005787
member_partyIndependent	0.0030093
member_partyNot applicable	0
office_locationDistrict or State office	0
office_locationSplit time evenly between both locations	0.0032407
primary_officeFull committee	0.003125
primary_officeSubcommittee	0.003125
primary_officeLeadership	0
primary_officeInstitutional Support (e.g. Sergeant at Arms, CAO, Legisla	0
primary_officeLegislative Branch Support (e.g. CBO, LOC, AOC)	0
primary_officeOther	0
Congress_chamberSenate	0.011111
Congress_chamberBoth	0
Congress_chamberNeither	0
salary_nominal	0.030556
ind_careerdevelopment	0.019676
ind_relnmgmt	0.049537
ind_benefitsseb	0.051852
ind_benefitssb2thru5	0.032639
ind_workenvironmentall	0.05

Table 20: Far More Hours Balance Results

	Median eCDF Difference
positionrecodePolicy_Leg_Research Positions	0.0019608
positionrecodePress_Communications Positions	0.031373
positionrecodeAdmin_Support Positions	0.088235
positionrecodeState_District Positions	0
tenure_currentposition	0.060784
tenure_Congress	0.054902
age2	0.052941
educationSome college	0.029412
educationAssociates degree	0
educationBachelors degree	0.035294
educationMasters degree	0.080392
educationLaw degree	0.0058824
educationDoctorate degree	0.0098039
hrs/wk in session	0.068627
hrs/wk out of session	0.054902
bonusNo	0.017647
bonusYes	0.056863
raiseNo	0.0078431
raiseYes	0.047059
race_white	0.05098
genderFemale	0.041176
supervision_nominal	0.066667
employment_statusPart-time employee	0
employment_statusTemporary employee	0
employment_statusShared employee	0
member_partyRepublican	0.0019608
member_partyIndependent	0.0098039
member_partyNot applicable	0
office_locationDistrict or State office	0
office_locationSplit time evenly between both locations	0.0098039
primary_officeFull committee	0.0098039
primary_officeSubcommittee	0
primary_officeLeadership	0.029412
primary_officeInstitutional Support (e.g. Sergeant at Arms, CAO, Legisla	0
primary_officeLegislative Branch Support (e.g. CBO, LOC, AOC)	0
primary_officeOther	0
Congress_chamberSenate	0.027451
Congress_chamberBoth	0
Congress_chamberNeither	0
salary_nominal	0.027451
ind_careerdevelopment	0.14118
ind_relnmgmt	0.12353
ind_benefitsseb	0.027451
ind_benefitssb2thru5	0.039216
ind_workenvironmentall	0.19804